Lightspeed
May 17, 2025

What We've Learned From Pump.Fun's Sniping Problem

This discussion dives into the rampant "sniping" problem on memecoin launchpad Pump.fun, where bots dominate initial token purchases, and examines the platform's attempts to combat this through mechanisms like variable fees.

The Pervasiveness of Sniping

  • "The worst thing about Pump.Fun...is that a majority of tokens are bought immediately after they're launched, like in the same block."
  • "Chances are you're already late the moment the token launches."
  • On Pump.fun, a significant portion of newly launched tokens are instantly acquired by automated bots, often within the very same block of their creation.
  • This rapid automated buying means that human users browsing for new memecoins typically miss the earliest entry points.
  • This front-running by bots is a major deterrent for users seeking fair launch opportunities.

The Uphill Battle of Anti-Bot Measures

  • "The bonding curve that these believe tokens trade on have an anti-bot mechanism where the fees are initially higher until it gets to a certain market cap and then the fees drop..."
  • "I do think though that like these things still can and will be sniped because even if the fees are a bit higher...it's going to be profitable even if you pay a higher fee obviously."
  • Pump.fun, in partnership with Meteora, implemented an anti-bot strategy for "believe" tokens, featuring higher initial trading fees that decrease as the token's market cap increases.
  • Despite these measures, particularly for highly anticipated launches (e.g., from a known "Silicon Valley growth hacker"), bots can still profitably snipe tokens by absorbing the higher fees.
  • The speakers note that sniper resistance is arguably more critical for "believe" tokens, which are framed as pseudo-equity, than for typical Pump.fun memecoins.

User Apathy and the Allure of the Game

  • "I think at such low market caps, no, I don't think users care... It's a lot like sports gambling, I think, at these ultra low market caps."
  • "At the end of the day, like one core feature matters...And for Pump, that's just the ability to participate in this game because it's pretty fun."
  • For tokens at extremely low market capitalizations, users generally appear unconcerned about sniping or higher initial fees, as the amounts wagered are typically small.
  • The activity is compared to sports gambling, where participants expect large, parlay-like payoffs and are often using disposable capital.
  • Despite systemic issues like sniping, the core attraction of Pump.fun remains its engaging, gamified experience and the potential for significant financial gains, ensuring its continued success much like MEV doesn't halt blockchain progress.

Key Takeaways:

  • The core appeal of platforms like Pump.fun often overshadows inherent problems like sniping, especially when small sums are involved. While solutions are explored, the "cat and mouse" game between platforms and bot operators continues.
  • Sniping Dominates: Most Pump.fun tokens are instantly botted, disadvantaging ordinary users.
  • Fees Don't Fully Deter: Higher initial fees on select tokens reduce, but don't eliminate, profitable sniping.
  • Gambling Appeal Persists: The thrill of potential 1000x gains keeps users engaged, largely indifferent to sniping at low stakes.

For further insights and detailed discussions, watch the full podcast: Link

This episode delves into the persistent problem of token sniping on memecoin platforms, exploring proposed anti-bot mechanisms and questioning whether such measures can truly deter sophisticated actors or significantly alter user behavior in high-risk, high-reward environments.

The Challenge of Sniping on Memecoin Platforms

  • Sniping (in crypto) refers to the use of automated bots to purchase newly launched tokens within moments of their debut, often in the same transaction block, aiming to secure the lowest possible price before the broader market can react.
  • Speaker 1 points out that this means for an average user browsing for promising memecoins, "chances are you're already late the moment the token launches." This immediate bot activity concentrates initial supply and diminishes opportunities for organic participants.
  • The core problem is that a majority of tokens are acquired by bots almost instantly, making it difficult for genuine users to participate fairly in early-stage investments.

"Believe" and Meteora's Anti-Bot Mechanism: A Potential Solution?

  • A bonding curve is a smart contract mechanism that algorithmically determines a token's price based on its circulating supply; as tokens are bought, the price increases along this predefined curve.
  • The proposed mechanism involves initially higher transaction fees that decrease as the token reaches a certain market capitalization. This is intended to make immediate, large-scale sniping economically less feasible.
  • Speaker 1 notes the scarcity of detailed documentation on how this mechanism precisely functions but emphasizes its goal: "if you can make it economically infeasible to flood the zone and snipe up all the supply, like that would be a good thing."
  • For Crypto AI researchers, the design and efficacy of such dynamic fee structures to mitigate bot activity present an interesting area of study, potentially applicable to other token launch models or decentralized systems.

User Indifference to Sniping at Low Market Caps

  • Speaker 2, offering a user-centric perspective, expresses skepticism about whether typical users are significantly concerned by sniping, especially at the very low market capitalizations characteristic of Pump.fun tokens.
  • They argue that the small amounts of money involved and the speculative, gambling-like nature of these investments mean users often accept such conditions. "It's a lot like sports gambling, I think, at these ultra low market caps... you expect a payoff similar to, you know, a multi-leg parlay. So to pay that kind of fee is kind of irrelevant."
  • This perspective suggests that for a certain class of highly speculative assets, the allure of massive potential gains overshadows concerns about imperfect market mechanics or slightly higher initial costs due to anti-sniping fees.
  • Investors should note this user tolerance, as it influences the viability of platforms despite known inefficiencies.

The Necessity of Sniper Resistance for "Equity-like" Tokens

  • While downplaying the impact of sniping on typical Pump.fun memecoins, Speaker 2 differentiates the needs of the "Believe" platform, suggesting its tokens might have characteristics closer to "pseudo equity."
  • For tokens intended to represent more substantial or long-term value (akin to equity), robust civil resistance becomes more critical. Civil resistance (often Sybil resistance) refers to a system's ability to defend against an attacker creating numerous fake identities to gain undue advantage.
  • Speaker 2 states, "you need more civil resistance in Believe or sorry sniper resistance in Believe than you do Pump.fun... you don't want a token that's pseudo equity equity or one day equity to be like sniped and then distributed or and potentially see one of those massive down candles."
  • This highlights a key strategic consideration: the type and purpose of a token dictate the necessary level of protection against manipulative trading activities. AI-driven analysis could help assess the "equity-like" nature of tokens and the corresponding risk from sniping.

Limitations of Fee-Based Anti-Sniping Measures

  • Speaker 1, while acknowledging the good intentions behind fee-based anti-sniping mechanisms, doubts their ultimate effectiveness against determined and well-informed snipers.
  • Even with higher initial fees, if a token is launched by a reputable creator or "Silicon Valley growth hacker," bots can still be programmed to buy immediately, and the potential profits from a successful project would likely outweigh the increased costs.
  • "So I don't know if this really does away with sniping necessarily," Speaker 1 remarks, suggesting that while such measures might deter casual or less sophisticated botting, they won't eliminate it for high-potential launches.
  • This implies that purely economic deterrents may have limited impact without more sophisticated technical solutions, a challenge where AI-driven anomaly detection or behavioral analysis might offer new approaches.

Market Dynamics: The Unstoppable Hunt for the Next 1000x

  • Both speakers acknowledge a fundamental market reality: the pervasive desire among participants to find the "next 1000x" investment before anyone else.
  • This intense speculative drive often leads users to overlook or tolerate issues like sniping and insider trading, as long as the perceived opportunity for outsized returns exists.
  • Speaker 1 notes the discouraging nature of these practices for personal use but concedes, "the market... just wants to look for the next thousandx before before everyone else has found it."
  • For investors and researchers, this underscores the powerful influence of market sentiment and hype cycles, which can temporarily overshadow concerns about fair market practices, especially in less regulated crypto niches.

Platform Viability Despite Pervasive Issues

  • Speaker 2 concludes by arguing that despite numerous issues like bugs, unethical behavior, and civil (Sybil) problems, platforms can still succeed if they deliver on a core, compelling feature.
  • For Pump.fun, this core feature is the "ability to participate in this game because it's pretty fun and it's attractive financially."
  • An analogy is drawn to MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) on blockchains or even issues in traditional markets like NASDAQ. MEV represents the profit that block producers can make by reordering, inserting, or censoring transactions within a block.
  • Speaker 2 asserts, "It's going to be a cat and mouse, but at the end of the day, it's not going to stop Pump.fun from being successful for the same reason that like Mev is not going to stop a chain from being successful... the benefits outweigh the costs."
  • This suggests that as long as a platform provides significant perceived value or entertainment, users may tolerate inherent systemic costs or imperfections. Crypto AI researchers might explore how AI could help quantify these "costs" versus "benefits" or design systems that better align incentives.

Conclusion

The discussion reveals that while sniping remains a significant challenge in memecoin markets, user tolerance and the allure of high returns often overshadow these concerns, suggesting that anti-bot measures must be exceptionally robust or integrated with other value propositions to be truly effective. Crypto AI investors and researchers should monitor the evolution of these anti-sniping mechanisms, as they offer insights into mitigating market manipulation, a persistent issue across various crypto applications.

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